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| Nuclear
Disarmament and Nonproliferation NGO letter in support
of DDA |
February 7, 2007 To: All Permanent Representatives to the United Nations Dear Ambassador: The undersigned represent New York-based civil society organizations that work on issues of disarmament and security in the United Nations context and have worked closely with the Department for Disarmament Affairs: Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, Reaching Critical Will/Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Hague Appeal for Peace, Global Action to Prevent War, Peace Boat US, Global Policy Forum, International Action Network on Small Arms, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security, Middle Powers Initiative, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, World Federation of United Nations Associations, and World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy. We write in support of keeping an independent Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), with its own mandate and Under-Secretary-General. We are greatly concerned by the Secretary-General’s proposal that the DDA become an office under the Secretary-General’s direct oversight headed by a special representative or high representative of the Secretary-General who would, at least initially, have the rank of assistant secretary-general. As elaborated below, such a change is a demotion of DDA in appearance, and likely would in fact decrease DDA’s importance, now or in the future, and prevent realization of its potential. The proposal also would cause practical problems by making the Secretary-General the focal point of conflicting demands regarding disarmament and non-proliferation and causing confusion about the authority and mandate of the head of the Disarmament Affairs office.
Disarmament is one of the central tasks of the United Nations. The first UN General Assembly resolution called for nuclear disarmament, and the UN Charter envisions the “the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources” (Article 26). The UN must live up to its mandate and prioritize disarmament in the Secretariat, maintaining the independent DDA instead of subordinating it to other agendas. The UN should not be reducing the stature of disarmament at a time when the problems posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as small arms, are escalating. The DDA was established in its current form in 1998 in order to address post-cold war disarmament and non-proliferation issues.[1] It is even more necessary in an era with increased opportunity for, but decreased attention to, disarmament. Moreover, the world's disarmament machinery, norms, and regimes are embattled now, and lowering the profile of the primary global agency responsible for implementation of UN decisions is the wrong course. In a January 4 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling for reassertion of the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world, former high U.S. officials George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, and Henry Kissinger and former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn characterized the present situation this way:
Especially in this historical context, it is important for the
Department for Disarmament Affairs to remain its own entity with
its own mandate and Under-Secretary-General whose primary concern
is disarmament. DDA houses years of technical and policy expertise
and institutional memory which are invaluable to governments and
civil society. It could be quietly lost if the DDA becomes an office
under direct oversight of the Secretary-General. When the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency was moved into the State Department,
the Agency’s technical expertise and institutional memory
was lost, as was internal advocacy for disarmament.
Further, there is potential, and the need, for DDA to do much more. For example, the DDA could house a successor to UNMOVIC, and become a center for addressing space and missile issues. Stripping DDA of its departmental status may undermine its capacity to fulfill its present functions, and almost certainly would prevent it from realizing its potential. A demoted DDA would lack the flexibility, mandate, and resources to play a significant role in emerging issues on the arms control agenda. We also observe that DDA has a good record on taking action-oriented
steps toward the inclusion of gender in all aspects of its work.
In March 2001, shortly after the Passage of UNSC Resolution 1325
on Women, Peace and Security, the DDA published a series of briefing
papers on gender and disarmament in collaboration with OSAGI and
DESA. In 2003, DDA continued this work by developing the first departmental
Gender Action Plan. Demoting a department that has emerged as a
leader in gender mainstreaming and in the promotion of Resolution
1325 sends the wrong message about which achievements are rewarded
and which are dismissed. Practical Problems with the Secretary-General’s Proposal As an independent department, DDA is shielded to some extent from
the intense political pressures that disarmament/non-proliferation
issues generate. If Disarmament Affairs is more closely associated
with the Secretary-General, inevitably political pressures from
all quarters would impede achievement of objectives. Further, the
Secretary-General himself could be harmed by failure to meet heightened
expectations. The Secretary-General can find other ways to strategically
intervene on important matters where his influence could make a
difference. The Secretary-General’s proposal may also introduce confusion over the Disarmament Affairs mission. DDA’s mandate is based on the directives of the current Secretary-General and his two predecessors as well as numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council. A special or high representative heading Disarmament Affairs would muddy the waters as to the extent of his or her mandate since the SRSG’s mandate generally is linked to the Secretary-General personally and is time-bound. It would be difficult to pursue new mandates within the field, as the USG can now do. While the Secretary-General’s proposal affirms that the office would continue to implement existing directives, the practice might be different. In short, we do not want DDA's mandate and chief to change from being part of the UN secretariat's institutional framework to being personally linked to changing Secretary-Generals. We appreciate the Secretary-General’s desire to give the disarmament/non-proliferation agenda a higher profile by associating it more directly with him. However, there are other ways to accomplish this that do not have the weaknesses of the proposal. In addition to taking a personal role, the Secretary-General could, for example, appoint to his staff a special advisor on disarmament/non-proliferation. If part of the motive for the DDA proposal is to keep the number of USGs constant in view of the proposal to split the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, that aim can be achieved by means that do not downgrade the DDA. There may be offices outside the peace and security field which could be headed by ASGs rather than USGs. Another possibility would be simply to increase the total number of USGs by one. Or the DPKO could have two divisions headed by ASGs, one for peace operations, one for field support. In sum, the Department for Disarmament Affairs must not lose its unique identity and mandate and its ability to report directly to the Secretary-General through its own Under-Secretary-General. The quantity and technical nature of the Department's work is sufficient to warrant a dedicated department, and the subject the Department covers is sufficiently urgent and complex to justify expansion rather than demotion to an office. Sincerely, John Burroughs Jennifer Nordstrom Cora Weiss Saul Mendlovitz Allison Boehm James Paul Mark Marge Vernon Nichols and Jim Nelson Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C. Ann Lakhdhir Pera Wells William Pace
[1] In 1997, a report of the Secretary-General explained the rationale for the establishment of DDA as follows: 2B.1 Disarmament is a central issue on the global agenda. With the end of super-Power rivalry, nationals everywhere have come to recognize their stake in the success of multilateral negotiations and the monitoring of weapons development. The emergence of new dangers and actors has added fresh urgency to the tasks that the United Nations is called upon to play in the area of disarmament. In the post-cold-war period, there is a growing threat from the spread of nuclear weapons technology and material, as well as a wider interest in acquiring biological and chemical weapons and means of delivery for such weapons. Regional warlords, criminal syndicates and various terrorist groups have during recent years become involved in trading in and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. The extensive use and destructive power of landmines in areas of armed conflict and the flow of conventional weapons and small arms into the hands of civilians have become items on the international agenda and have often to be addressed in the context of peacekeeping operations. 2B.2 Consequently, a managerial reorganization of Secretariat capacities will now be effected so that a structure can be put in place to respond more effectively the priorities of Member States in the fields of disarmament and arms regulations. A Department for Disarmament and Arms Regulation will therefore be established, headed by an Under-Secretary-General. United Nations reform: measures and proposals: Proposed programme budget for the biennium 1998-1999: Report of the Secretary-General. A/52/203 (11 September 1997), p. 13 (emphasis supplied). |
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