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The U.S. Report on UNSC 1540: Dubious Progress
Elizabeth Shafer, J.D., Board Member, LCNP
In September 2004 the U.S. issued its report on progress
in its efforts to implement United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540. The resolution, proposed by the U.S. and
adopted in April 2004, requires States to prohibit and criminalize
the possession, transfer, and use, by non-state actors, of
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and to adopt
measures to prevent or control the transit and transfer of
such weapons, delivery systems and related materials.
There was initial resistance by some Security Council members
to support the draft resolution on the grounds that NBC proliferation,
including to non-State actors, could not be adequately prevented
without progress on comprehensive prohibition and disarmament.
As a result, text was added to the resolution encouraging
all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties
and agreements to which they are party and calling on
States to adopt national rules and regulations, where
it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their
commitments under the key multilateral nonproliferation treaties;
(which includes the disarmament obligation in the Nuclear
Non- Proliferation Treaty).
The U.S. 1540 Report, however, reflects the current administration
focus against terrorism and horizontal proliferation (the
spread of NBC weapons and related materials to countries not
in possession of them) and lack of steps to reverse vertical
proliferation (in particular the continued possession and
development of nuclear weapons and related materials by the
nuclear weapon states). The US report ignores the disarmament
provisions in the resolution and can only be viewed as limited,
incremental and of minimal effectiveness. On the other hand,
the US has developed sophisticated mechanisms for control
of materials which, although designed for nonproliferation,
could have potential use in the development and promotion
of disarmament steps.
For example, the US reported on radiation detection equipment
and nonintrusive inspection imaging technology which it has
developed for screening containers. Such equipment could complement
International Atomic Energy Agency methods for verifying a
fissile material cut-off treaty. The US also reports on its
accounting of nuclear warheads, information which would be
useful for an international inventory of nuclear weapons
a key precursor to comprehensive nuclear disarmament agreements.
The US report to the 1540 Committee is of much greater detail
and interest than the US reports to the NPT Review Conferences,
as are most other country reports. As such, perhaps the NPT
Review Conferences could make further progress on the consideration
of verification and control measures for disarmament if they
use the information from the 1540 reports.
The US Report goes into considerable detail about the mechanisms
the US has developed and implemented to control fissile materials,
bio-toxins and chemical precursors. These include , for example,
cooperative agreements between the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) and the World Health Organization
and the Pan American Health Organization, to enhance capabilities
for early detection, reporting, and response to infectious
disease threats related to bio-terrorism (U.S. Report, p.
18). Another example is the container Security Initiative,
involving cooperation with the governments of twenty foreign
ports to implement detailed screening procedures in order
to address the threat of containerized shipping concealing
NBC weapons (Ibid., p. 16). In general it would seem that
such U.S. efforts are cooperative, transnational ones involving
international public health and safety. Other States may be
able to adopt or join some of these. Collectively such measures
will have some positive effect in preventing proliferation
of NBC weapons and related materials.
However, so long as the NWS retain stockpiles of nuclear
weapons and related materials, there is the potential for
non- State actors and additional States to acquire nuclear
materials and develop nuclear weapons. In the case of non-State
actors there is even the possibility of stealing warheads
or infiltrating nuclear control systems in order to acquire
control over nuclear weapons. In the case of proliferation
to States, the continued possession of nuclear weapons by
some States provides a stimulus to others to acquire them
in response.
Thus, as Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, the UN ambassador for Brazil
said, limiting the resolution to the question of nonproliferation
as the overriding threat was inadequate. At the same time,
disarmament must be pursued in good faith. Without such a
comprehensive approach, all efforts to make the world safer
were bound to fall short. (UN Security Council Press
Release SC/8076, Security Council decides all States shall
act to prevent proliferation of mass destruction weapons.
28 April 2004, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2004/sc8076.doc.htm)
The basic problem in the U.S. approach, therefore, is its
total disregard of its disarmament obligations, (notwithstanding
the lip-service paid to disarmament in its report). Regarding
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) the U.S statement
that it actively and strongly promotes universal adoption,
full implementation, and strengthening of the NPT is at best
disingenuous. Its statement that (t)he United States abides
by all of its NPT obligations and participates fully in the
NPT review process is patently false. The reality is
that for the past thirty-seven years, since signing the NPT
in 1968, the U.S. has evaded its obligation under Article
VI of the NPT, to undertake to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.
The mandatory nature of these legal obligations was underscored
by the International Court of Justice, in its 1996 Advisory
Opinion, that there exists an obligation to pursue in
good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control.
There are similar, if less glaring, inconsistencies between
the glowing statements in the U.S. report of continued progress
in its support and promotion of multinational treaties such
as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical
Weapons Convention (BWC); and its history of delays and obstructions
regarding them.
In introducing the resolution, one of the key aims of the
US was to increase participation of other States in cooperative
counter-proliferation efforts led by the US. While this may
occur to some degree, it will be limited by a growing dissatisfaction
by States with US antipathy towards multilateral mechanisms
to deal with these issues. The US, for example, has walked
away from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, blocked negotiations
for a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention,
blocked negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty,
stalled negotiations of the Draft Convention on the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and refused to join the International
Criminal Court.
In addition, the lack of credibility in the U.S. rationale
for invading Iraq (illusory Weapons of Mass Destruction) and
U.S. denials of links between official policies and the torture
of prisoners by American soldiers in Guantanamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib-- as documented by Seymour Hersh in Chain of Command
(HarperCollins, 2004), has further eroded the international
reputation of the U.S., whether this concerns issues of security
or human rights.
Thus, vis-a-vis the U.S. and UNSC 1540, it would seem that
any positive future role for the U.S. in the field of nonproliferation
would begin with its turning toward an approach of genuine
cooperation and respect for multilateral treaties. Such action
could eventually lead toward an international resumption of
credibility in the integrity of the U.S., and progress on
U.S. policy could be measured in its change from incremental
steps on nonproliferation to a multilateral, comprehensive
approach to nuclear disarmament.
Documents and contacts:
US Report to the UN Security Council 1540 Committee
www.state.gov/t/np/rls/37375.htm
NGO Information on Security Council Resolution 1540
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/SC/SC.html
UN Security Council Resolution 1540
http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee
1540/Res1540(E).pdf
UN Security Council 1540 Committee
http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee
1540/index.html
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